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Cognitive control enables adaptive behavior in a dynamically changing environment. In this
context, one prominent adaptation effect is the sequential conflict adjustment, i.e., the
observation of reduced response interference on trials following conflict trials. Increasing
evidence suggests that such response conflicts are registered as aversive signals. So far,
however, the functional role of this aversive signal for conflict adaptation to occur has not
been put to test directly. In two experiments, the affective valence of conflict stimuli was
manipulated by fluency of processing (stimulus contrast). Experiment 1 used a flanker
interference task, Experiment 2 a color-word Stroop task. In both experiments, conflict
adaptation effects were only present in fluent, but absent in disfluent trials. Results thus
speak against the simple idea that any aversive stimulus feature is suited to promote
specific conflict adjustments. Two alternative but not mutually exclusive accounts, namely
resource competition and adaptation-by-motivation, will be discussed.
Keywords: conflict adaptation, aversive signal, fluency of processing
INTRODUCTION
In an environment full of tempting opportunities and action
affordances, appropriate action selection is a constant challenge.
For example, grabbing the low fat yogurt instead of the rich
but more delicious chocolate mousse from the fridge can be a
hard decision. In situations like this, cognitive control supports
the selection of the weaker but intended action in the face of
a stronger but inadequate action (c.f. Miller and Cohen, 2001).
Moreover, when confronted with response conflicts, cognitive
control not only enables conflict resolution in the current trial but
also adjusts processing parameters such that the cognitive system
is better prepared when the response conflict repeats as indicated
by reduced response interference in post-conflict trials (Gratton
et al., 1992; Botvinick et al., 1999; Notebaert et al., 2001; Stürmer
et al., 2002; Caessens et al., 2005; Egner, 2008; Wühr and Kunde,
2008). On a neuronal level, it has been suggested that it is the
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) that detects conflicts and sends
this information to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex which then
increases control in the post-conflict trial (e.g., Botvinick et al.,
2004; Kerns et al., 2004).
In the past decade, huge advances have been made to further
our understanding of the underlying processes that enable such
dynamic control adaptations (for recent approaches to conflict
adaptation effects see for example Braem et al., 2014; Duthoo
et al., 2014; Jiang et al., 2014). Questions of interest concerned
the locus and specificity of the adaptation effect (e.g., Kiesel
et al., 2006; Kunde and Wühr, 2006; Notebaert and Verguts,
2008; Wendt et al., 2012), the role of episodic retrieval and
priming processes (e.g., Mayr et al., 2003; Hommel et al., 2004),
the role of learning (e.g., Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Blais et al.,
2007; Verguts and Notebaert, 2009; Blais and Verguts, 2012),
timing (e.g., Goschke and Dreisbach, 2008; Scherbaum et al.,
2011; Pastötter et al., 2013), conflict strength (e.g., Takezawa and
Miyatani, 2005; Forster et al., 2011; Wendt et al., 2014), working
memory load (Stürmer et al., 2005; Fischer et al., 2010; Soutschek
et al., 2012), and context effects in general (e.g., Fischer et al.,
2008; Funes et al., 2010).
Only recently, the question of how stress, affect and motiva-
tion might influence processing adjustments has moved into the
focus of research (e.g., van Steenbergen et al., 2009, 2010, 2012;
Kuhbandner and Zehetleitner, 2011; Padmala et al., 2011; Plessow
et al., 2011; Stürmer et al., 2011; Braem et al., 2012; see Dreisbach
and Fischer, 2012a, for a review). The role of affect in sequential
conflict adaptation is of specific interest here due to the increasing
evidence that conflicts themselves are experienced as aversive sig-
nals (Dreisbach and Fischer, 2012b; Schouppe et al., 2012, 2015;
Fritz and Dreisbach, 2013, 2014). For example, presenting Stroop
conflict stimuli (Stroop, 1935) as primes eased the evaluation of
negative target stimuli and increased the frequency of negative
judgments for neutral target stimuli (Dreisbach and Fischer,
2012b; Fritz and Dreisbach, 2013, 2014). Converging evidence in
favor of the aversive conflict signal also comes from physiological
studies showing increased heart rate (Renaud and Blondin, 1997),
larger pupil dilatation (van Steenbergen and Band, 2013; Wendt
et al., 2014), and enhanced skin conductance response (Kobayashi
et al., 2007) in response to incongruent Stroop stimuli (but see
Schacht et al., 2010, who, however, did not use Stroop stimuli
but measured physiological activity during a go/no-go paradigm).
Given that conflicts are detected by the ACC, and further given
that the ACC is also activated by monetary loss (Rainville, 2002),
social exclusion (Eisenberger et al., 2003), negative feedback
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004), and pain (Singer et al., 2004), one
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might therefore speculate that it is not the response conflict per se
but the aversive character of the response conflict that triggers the
processing adjustments (Botvinick, 2007; Dreisbach and Fischer,
in press a, in press b). In fact, Dreisbach and Fischer (2011)
found that aversive stimuli can lead to sequential adaptation
effects even in the absence of response conflicts. In that study,
the authors made use of the fact that fluency of processing, i.e.,
the experienced ease of stimulus processing, is affectively marked,
with low fluency being associated with negative and high fluency
with positive affect (Reber et al., 1998; Winkielman et al., 2003)1.
Dreisbach and Fischer (2011) let participants categorize number
words according to magnitude that were either written in an
easy (fluent) or hard to read (disfluent) font. In three experi-
ments, the authors found sequential modulations of the fluency
effect (performance difference between disfluent and fluent trials)
in terms of a smaller fluency effect following disfluent trials.
Moreover, van Steenbergen and colleagues repeatedly showed
that presenting positive symbols in the inter-trial-intervals of
an Eriksen Flanker task (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974) eliminated
conflict adaptation effects (van Steenbergen et al., 2009, 2012;
but see Stürmer et al., 2011; Braem et al., 2013b; Notebaert and
Braem, in press). Van Steenbergen and colleagues interpreted
this result as indication that the positive symbol counteracted
the aversive signal of the response conflict and thus eliminated
conflict adaptation.
In sum, the observations that (1) aversive signals without
response conflict promote sequential processing adjustments
(Dreisbach and Fischer, 2011) and (2) positive signals following
response conflict eliminate processing adjustments (van Steen-
bergen et al., 2009, 2012), might suggest that the aversive char-
acteristic of conflicts itself triggers the processing adjustments2.
One straightforward way to address the question whether it is
the aversive conflict signal that triggers conflict adaptation is
to increase the aversiveness of a given conflict stimulus and
investigate its effects on conflict adaptation. As already men-
tioned above, perceptual fluency serves as an affective signal
with high perceptual fluency being associated with positive affect
and low perceptual fluency being associated with negative affect
(Reber et al., 1998; Winkielman et al., 2003). Therefore, we
manipulated the aversive quality of a conflict signal by present-
1It is important to note that it has been shown empirically that not only
is perceptual fluency associated with positive affect but also that perceptual
disfluency is associated with negative affect. In three experiments, Reber et al.
(1998) applied different manipulations of perceptual fluency and examined
the consequences on preference judgments. In Experiment 1, participants
judged drawings that were preceded by mismatching primes (i.e., perceptually
disfluent stimuli) as being less pretty than drawings that were preceded by
matching primes. In Experiment 3, participants stated to dislike stimuli more
that were presented for shorter periods of time than stimuli that were pre-
sented for longer time periods. Finally, and most similar to the manipulation
of perceptual fluency used in the present study, in Experiment 2, Reber
et al. (1998) let participants judge circle stimuli that varied in figure-ground
contrast. They found that the circles were judged as less pretty and more
ugly with decreasing figure-ground contrast, i.e., with decreasing perceptual
fluency.
2There are a couple of studies, however, suggesting that it is not the affective
value of conflicts but the rewarding effect of conflict resolution that leads to
post-conflict adjustment (Braem et al., 2012; see also Schouppe et al., 2015).
ing classical response interference tasks either with high per-
ceptual fluency (fluent) or with low perceptual fluency (dis-
fluent), expecting that disfluent incongruent trials are more
aversive than fluent incongruent trials. Consequently, if it is
an unspecific aversiveness conveyed by the conflict that triggers
conflict adaptation, we should find increased conflict adaptation
on disfluent trials as compared to fluent trials, as disfluency is
assumed to increase the general aversiveness of conflicts even
further.
EXPERIMENT 1
METHOD
Participants
Thirty students of the University of Regensburg were tested
(23 female; 24 right-handers; mean age: 26.6, SD = 4.1). All
participants signed informed consent before the experiment and
received 3 Euros or partial course credit after its completion. Data
of two participants with RTs that were more than two standard
deviations (SDs) above at least one group cell mean were excluded
from the analysis, leaving a final sample of 28 participants.
Material and procedure
Stimuli consisted of a central color-square horizontally flanked
by two color-squares, one on each side. The three horizontally
aligned squares subtended a visual angle of 19.9° × 6.6° at a
viewing distance of 60 cm. Square colors were red, green, and
blue. Congruency was manipulated by color match or mismatch:
The color of the central square could either match (congruent
stimulus) or mismatch (incongruent stimulus) the color of the
two flanking squares which were always of the same color. Fluency
was manipulated by figure-ground contrast differences. In fluent
stimuli, color saturation was 100%, in disfluent stimuli, color
saturation was 50%. Fluency of relevant and irrelevant stimulus
dimensions was manipulated to the same extent by stimulus
contrast such that no effect on the conflict per se is to be expected
(Miles and Proctor, 2009). The stimuli were presented centrally
on a white background. Participants were instructed to quickly
and accurately identify the color of the central square by pressing
one of three keys on a QWERTZ keyboard (“c” for green, “v” for
red, “b” for blue, respectively) with their index, middle and ring
finger of their dominant hand (see Larson et al., 2009, for a similar
procedure).
Each trial started with a plus sign as fixation cross for 250 ms,
followed by the imperative stimulus that was presented until a
response was given. For correct responses, the next trial started
after 1000 ms. For errors, the German word for error (Fehler)
appeared and remained on screen for 1000 ms. After an additional
500 ms, the next trial started. The experiment started with a
short test to exclude color blindness, followed by a color-to-key-
mapping practice block of 12 randomly presented imperative
stimuli and a second practice block of 24 imperative stimuli where
participants were introduced to the fluency manipulation. After
that, one practice block of 120 trials followed consisting of 30 con-
gruent and 30 incongruent fluent and disfluent trials, respectively.
This practice block was followed by three experimental blocks
of 120 trials each. Blocks were separated from one another by
self-paced breaks. Repetition of identical target stimuli was not
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FIGURE 1 | RTs (ms) and error rates (%) as a function of CongruencyN and CongruencyN-1 for fluent (A) and disfluent (B) trials of Experiment 1. Error
bars represent standard errors of the mean. The symbol “*” denotes a significant interaction CongruencyN × CongruencyN-1.
allowed. Because we were interested in how fluency modulates
conflict adaptation, we presented fluent and disfluent trials in
runs of 10 in a given block while for the assessment of conflict
adaptation, conflict vs. non-conflict trials varied randomly from
trial to trial. The experiment lasted about 25 min.
Design
A 2 (CongruencyN)× 2 (CongruencyN-1)× 2 (Fluency) repeated
measures design was used.
Data preprocessing
We excluded the first two trials of each fluency block of 10 trials
length in order to remove possible transition effects from the
previous fluency condition. In order to decrease the influence of
low-level feature repetitions and to maximize cognitive control
involvement in conflict adaptation (e.g., Egner, 2007), partial
priming trials [whenever the color of either the central or flanking
stimulus repeated from trial N-1 to trial N (42.3%)] and negative
priming trials [whenever the color of the flanking squares in trial
N-1 was the color of the central square in trial N (18.5%)] were
excluded prior to analysis (see also Ullsperger et al., 2005; Bugg,
2008; Larson et al., 2009; Wendt et al., 2014)3. For error data
analysis, mean error rates for the remaining data (on average
134 trials per participant) were computed for each cell of the 2
(CongruencyN) × 2 (CongruencyN-1) × 2 (Fluency) design and
entered into a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA).
3Because the post hoc removal of all stimulus/feature repetitions is standard
procedure in studying conflict adaptation, the experiment was from the
beginning designed to provide a sufficiently large number of trials per cell.
An a priory exclusion of critical stimulus sequences was not considered an
option as it induces expectation biases. For a recent discussion of theoretical
and practical guidelines in the investigations of conflict adaptation see Duthoo
et al. (2014) and Egner (2014).
Additionally, for RT data analysis, erroneous as well as post-error
trials (together 6.7%) and all RTs that exceeded more than two
SDs from the individual cell mean (4.9%) were excluded prior
to analysis. For the remaining data (on average 121 trials per
participant), mean RTs for each cell of the 2 (CongruencyN) × 2
(CongruencyN-1) × 2 (Fluency) design were computed and a
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Error data
There was a marginally significant interaction of CongruencyN ×
CongruencyN-1, F(1,27)= 3.375, p= 0.077, η2 = 0.111, reflecting
a typical conflict adaptation effect. The congruency effect was
less pronounced following incongruentN-1 (−1.16%) as com-
pared to following congruentN-1 trials (2.42%). Importantly, this
conflict adaptation effect was further modulated by Fluency,
F(1,27) = 4.675, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.145 (see Figure 1). In fluent
trials, participants showed a significant conflict adaptation effect,
F(1,27) = 5.783, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.176, i.e., an inverted con-
gruency effect for trials following incongruent trials (−3.67%)
as compared to following congruent trials (2.69%). In disfluent
trials, however, the effect of CongruencyN was unaffected by
CongruencyN-1, F < 1, p > 0.706, η2 < 0.006. No further effects
were significant, all Fs < 2.873, all ps > 0.101, all η2s < 0.097.
RT data
The main effects of CongruencyN, F(1,27) = 22.515, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.464, and Fluency, F(1,27) = 5.051, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.163,
were significant. RT was lower for congruentN (633.45 ms)
as compared to incongruentN (673.90 ms) trials and lower
for fluent (642.59 ms) as compared to disfluent (664.76 ms)
trials. Furthermore, there was a significant interaction of
CongruencyN × Fluency, F(1,27) = 7.239, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.218:
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The Congruency effect was less pronounced in fluent (12.63 ms)
as compared to disfluent trials (68.27 ms). No further effects were
significant, all Fs < 1.019, all ps > 0.321, all η2s < 0.039.
The main results of Experiment 1 can be summarized
as follows: The higher order interaction of CongruencyN ×
CongruencyN-1 × Fluency found in the error data showed
the usual significant conflict adaptation effect on fluent trials
(i.e., stimuli with high stimulus contrast as used in standard
paradigms), and a significantly reduced and virtually absent
conflict adaptation effect for disfluent trials. The results thus
suggest that, if anything, increasing the general aversiveness of
conflicts by reducing the stimulus contrast eliminates the conflict
adaptation effect. This contradicts the idea that adding unspecific
aversiveness to a conflict stimulus increases specific adaptation
effects. In order to consolidate the findings from Experiment 1,
we ran a second experiment with a different response conflict
paradigm, i.e., a manual version of the Stroop task (Stroop,
1935). If the results from Experiment 1 (the modulation of the
conflict adaptation effect by fluency with an elimination thereof in
disfluent trials) can be replicated in Experiment 2, it can be ruled
out that the effects were driven by paradigm specific parameters
and thus highlight the findings’ generalizability.
EXPERIMENT 2
METHOD
Participants
Thirty students of the University of Regensburg were tested
(23 female; 28 right-handers; mean age: 23.1, SD = 3.7). All
participants signed informed consent before the experiment and
received 3 Euros or partial course credit after its completion. Data
of three participants with RTs that were more than two SDs above
at least one group cell mean were excluded from the analysis,
leaving a final sample of 27 participants.
Material and procedure
Stimuli were the German color words for RED (rot), GREEN
(grün), and BLUE (blau) printed in red, green, and blue (RGB
values of 255,0,0; 0,255,0; and 0,0,255, respectively). The words
were written in Arial bold, 24 point, each letter subtending a
visual angle of approximately 0.8° × 0.8° at a viewing distance
of 60 cm. Congruency was manipulated by color-word match
or mismatch: The print color could either match (congruent
stimuli) or mismatch (incongruent stimuli) the word meaning of
the stimulus. Again, fluency was manipulated by figure-ground
contrast differences. In fluent stimuli, color saturation was 100%,
in disfluent stimuli, color saturation was 50%. The stimuli were
presented centrally on a white background. Participants’ task was
to quickly and accurately identify the print color of the word while
ignoring its meaning by pressing one of three keys on a QWERTZ
keyboard (“c” for green, “v” for red, “b” for blue, respec-
tively) with their index, middle, and ring finger of their domi-
nant hand. Trial and block procedure remained the same as in
Experiment 1.
Design
A 2 (CongruencyN)× 2 (CongruencyN-1)× 2 (Fluency) repeated
measures design was used.
Data preprocessing
We excluded the first two trials of each fluency block of 10 trials
length in order to remove possible transition effects from the
previous fluency condition. Furthermore, partial priming trials
[whenever the color or color word repeated from trial N-1 to
trial N (46.6%)] and negative priming trials [whenever the color
word in trial N-1 was the color of the stimulus in trial N (16.2%)]
were excluded prior to analysis to ensure that priming effects did
not mask conflict adaptation. For error data analysis, mean error
rates for the remaining data (on average 130 trials per partici-
pant) were computed for each cell of the 2 (CongruencyN) × 2
(CongruencyN-1) × 2 (Fluency) design and entered into a
repeated measures ANOVA. Additionally, for RT data analysis,
erroneous as well as post-error trials (together 7.5%) and all RTs
that exceeded more than two SDs from the individual cell mean
(4.6%) were excluded prior to analysis. For the remaining data
(on average 118 trials per participant), mean RTs for each cell
of the 2 (CongruencyN) × 2 (CongruencyN-1) × 2 (Fluency)
design were computed and a repeated measures ANOVA was
conducted.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Error data
There was a significant main effect of CongruencyN, F(1,26) =
16.335, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.386, and a marginally significant effect
of Fluency, F(1,26) = 3.028, p = 0.094, η2 = 0.104. Error rates
were lower for congruentN (2.39%) as compared to incongruentN
(4.65%) trials and lower for fluent (3.19%) as compared to
disfluent trials (3.85%). No further effects were significant, all
Fs < 2.331, all ps > 0.138, all η2s < 0.083.
RT data
The main effects of CongruencyN, F(1,26) = 86.941, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.770, CongruencyN-1, F(1,26) = 10.821, p < 0.01, η2 =
0.294, and Fluency, F(1,26) = 5.371, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.171,
were significant. RT was lower for trials following incongruent
trials (636.34 ms) as compared to congruent trials (659.30 ms),
lower for congruentN (582.21 ms) as compared to incongruentN
(713.42 ms) trials and lower for fluent (636.71 ms) as compared to
disfluent (658.92 ms) trials. As in the accuracy data of Experiment
1, the interaction of CongruencyN × CongruencyN-1 × Fluency
was significant, F(1,26) = 6.604, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.203 (see
Figure 2). In fluent trials, participants showed a significant con-
flict adaptation effect, F(1,26) = 8.220, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.240,
i.e., a smaller congruency effect for trials following incongruent
trials (104.56 ms) as compared to following congruent trials
(154.42 ms). In disfluent trials, however, the congruency effect
was unaffected by CongruencyN-1 (137.98 ms following incon-
gruent and 127.86 ms following congruent trials), F = 0.323,
p = 0.574, η2 = 0.012. No further effects were significant, all
Fs < 1.932, ps > 0.175, all η2s < 0.070.
In Experiment 2, the higher order interaction CongruencyN ×
CongruencyN-1 × Fluency was significant in the RT data. Again,
the conflict adaptation effect was only significant in fluent tri-
als but was eliminated in disfluent trials. Taken together, both
experiments brought up converging evidence that sequential con-
flict adaptation, if present in fluent trials, is entirely reduced in
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FIGURE 2 | RTs (ms) and error rates (%) as a function of CongruencyN and CongruencyN-1 for fluent (A) and disfluent (B) trials of Experiment 2. Error
bars represent standard errors of the mean. The symbol “*” denotes a significant interaction CongruencyN × CongruencyN-1.
disfluent trials. This contradicts the idea that any aversive signal is
suited to trigger stimulus-specific adaptation effects.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Based on a theoretical framework of ACC functioning (Botvinick,
2007) and recent findings of (1) conflict aversiveness (Dreisbach
and Fischer, 2012b; Schouppe et al., 2012, 2015; Fritz and
Dreisbach, 2013, 2014), (2) elimination of conflict adaptation
by positive action effects (van Steenbergen et al., 2009, 2012),
and (3) sequential adaptation triggered by non-conflict aversive
(disfluent) stimuli (Dreisbach and Fischer, 2011), we directly
tested whether increasing the aversive value of conflict stimuli
also increases sequential adaptation effects. To this end, we pre-
sented conflict stimuli with either high or low perceptual flu-
ency. Because disfluency is experienced as aversive signal (Reber
et al., 1998), this manipulation is suited to modulate the affective
valence of conflict stimuli. If conflict adaptation is triggered
by the aversive nature of conflict stimuli independently from
the conflict information, then the increased negative valence of
disfluent incongruent as compared to fluent incongruent trials
might increase adaptation effects.
Results from both experiments, however, did not support this
idea. In contrast, whenever the typical conflict adaptation was
found for fluent trials (in the error data in Experiment 1 and in
the RT data in Experiment 2), disfluency eliminated conflict adap-
tation effects entirely. And this cannot be explained by reduced
conflict strength on disfluent trials because conflict was either
unaffected by the fluency manipulation (Experiment 2) or even
increased (Experiment 1) for disfluent trials4.
4Miles and Proctor (2009) found that decreasing both, the discriminability of
the relevant and irrelevant stimulus feature, does not change the magnitude of
In both experiments, conflict adaptation was only present
in one of the dependent measures, i.e., error rates in Experi-
ment 1 and RT data in Experiment 2. Thus, neither RT data
in Experiment 1 nor error rates in Experiment 2 were further
modulated by disfluency. Indeed, there have been many studies
reporting similar findings, i.e., conflict adaptation effects being
only present in RT data OR error data (see, e.g., Ullsperger et al.,
2005; Bugg, 2008; van Steenbergen et al., 2010, 2012; Puccioni
and Vallesi, 2012; Soutschek et al., 2012). So far, there has been
no study that directly addressed why the conflict adaptation effect
is sometimes found in the RT data while it is found in the error
data in other cases. The important result of our study, however,
is that the dependent measure that showed the typical conflict
adaptation effect on fluent trials in the respective experiment
(i.e., error rates in Experiment 1 and RT data in Experiment 2)
also brought up a higher order interaction with fluency: While
conflict adaptation is intact on fluent trials, disfluency leads to its
elimination.
These consistent findings from two independent experiments
have an important implication: They demonstrate that increasing
unspecific aversiveness, for example by decreasing fluency of pro-
cessing, does not inevitably lead to stronger conflict adaptation
but in contrast may even diminish it. Thus, it is conceivable that
the congruency effect in two response conflict paradigms. Thus, we assumed
that in our experiments, the fluency manipulation would likewise leave
the congruency effect unaffected. However, the interaction of fluency with
congruency was significant for the Flanker task in Experiment 1. Although
we do not have an explanation for this effect, still, this does not weaken our
argument: conflict adaptation is absent in disfluent as compared to fluent trials
even though conflict magnitude was bigger in disfluent trials. It seems thus
that the demotivating effect of continued disfluency (see Discussion below)
overrules the effect of enhanced conflict aversiveness.
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aversiveness might need to be tied to conflict processing and not
to stimulus processing in general.
An important question, however, remains: why does reduced
fluency of processing (and thus, increased aversiveness) not only
not increase or not affect conflict adaptation, but eliminates
it? Here, a potential answer could be that reducing fluency of
processing might come with side effects other than the aversive
connotation that could directly have affected conflict adaptation.
For example, processing of disfluent stimuli might have
increased processing demands and invested effort (e.g., Dreisbach
and Fischer, 2011). There is already ample evidence that conflict
adaptation is modulated by processing demands of primary task
processing. For example, Fischer et al. (2008) had participants
complete a number magnitude task (i.e., indicate whether a given
number was bigger or smaller than 5) combined with a Simon
task (i.e., numbers appeared on the right or left side of the
screen). They found the typical sequential conflict adaptation in
the Simon task which was further modulated by the cognitive
demand of the number magnitude task: Following numbers close
to the reference standard (high processing demand), the Simon
adaptation was smaller than following numbers far from the
reference standard (low processing demand). Likewise, Soutschek
et al. (2012) reported evidence that high working memory load
eliminates conflict adaptation in the Stroop task. Applied to our
results presented here, one might thus argue that disfluent trials
draw on processing resources that were then not available for
conflict adaptation. Does that imply that the aversive character
of disfluency had no effect in our study? Interestingly, Pessoa
(2009) claimed that not only different cognitive processes share
and compete for the same restricted resource capacities, but that
cognitive and affective processes do so as well. Indeed, it has been
shown that performance in incongruent trials decreased when
preceded by an affective task-irrelevant picture (Hart et al., 2010),
suggesting that the processing of the affective stimulus consumed
resources that would otherwise have benefited conflict resolution.
In the same line and more directly related to our study, Padmala
et al. (2011) reported that presenting highly arousing negative
pictures as compared to neutral pictures in inter-trial-intervals
of a Stroop-like word-face task eliminated conflict adaptation
effects (see also Braem et al., 2013b). The authors, too, explained
this finding in terms of resource competition: The resources that
are necessary for post-conflict adaptation were consumed by the
processing of the arousing aversive pictures and were then lacking
for conflict adaptation. In the light of these findings, the resource
competition account might explain our data, as well. As disfluency
is associated with negative affect, the processing of the aversive
quality in disfluent blocks may have demanded resources that
would otherwise have been used to adapt control in post-conflict
trials5.
5An alternative, yet similar, explanation of reduced conflict adaptation effects
in affectively negative conditions grounds on the idea that the effects of neg-
ative mood (cf. van Steenbergen, 2015) or more generally, arousal (cf. Braem
et al., 2013a), on cognitive control follow an inverted U shaped function: while
moderate levels of arousal are beneficial for cognitive control processes, too
little or too much arousal is detrimental. For example, Braem et al. (2013b)
found that the influence of punishment on conflict adaptation critically
depends on individual punishment sensitivity: while punishing individuals
A second, very recent line of research that is of interest to
our results deals with the motivational impact of conflict res-
olution on conflict adaptation. According to this adaptation-
by-motivation account, conflict adaptation is triggered by the
rewarding experience of conflict resolution (Braem et al., 2012).
This idea is grounded on the observation that solving a difficult
task is more rewarding than solving an easy task (Shalley and
Oldham, 1985; Satterthwaite et al., 2012). For example, Satterth-
waite et al. (2012) used an n-back task and were able to show that
the activation in the ventral striatum, a key region of dopamine
production, increased with increasing task difficulty. The most
direct evidence for the role of reward for conflict adaptation
has recently been put forward by Braem et al. (2012). In that
study, participants were presented with an Eriksen Flanker task
(Experiment 1). In the experimental condition, 25% of trials of
a given block were rewarded for correct and fast performance,
whereas in the remaining 75% of the trials, no reward was
given. In the control condition, no reward was given ever. Results
brought up sequential conflict adaptation effects in the control
condition (no reward) and in rewarded trials in the experimental
condition. Intriguingly, no such conflict adaptation was found
for unrewarded trials in the reward context. According to the
authors, the extrinsic reward signal on 25% of trials replaced or
overshadowed the intrinsic reward signal normally generated in
standard (no-reward) conflict tasks. As a consequence, the no-
reward trials lacked the intrinsic rewarding experience that would
have been necessary to trigger conflict adaptation.
Back to the data presented here, the adaptation-by-motivation
account also fits with our findings. Notably, fluency of processing
has been shown to modulate motivation directly. For example,
Song and Schwarz (2008) found that participants were less moti-
vated to carry out a task that was described in a hard to read
(disfluent) font as compared to a task described in an easy to
read (fluent) font. Applied to our experiments, the continuous
experience of disfluency throughout the mini-blocks of disfluent
trials might have reduced the motivation to adapt. Put differently,
in disfluent mini-blocks, the rewarding effect of a successful
conflict resolution might have been counteracted by the discour-
aging continuous disfluent experience. Therefore, the repeated
disfluent experience eliminated the intrinsic reward signal that
typically follows successful conflict resolution, thereby decreasing
the conflict adaptation effect. Further support for this motiva-
tional account comes from studies showing that an increase in
participants’ motivation goes along with decreased RTs and error
rates and decreased congruency effects, mimicking our results in
the fluent as compared to the disfluent conditions (e.g., Veling and
Aarts, 2010; Padmala and Pessoa, 2011; Soutschek et al., 2014).
low in punishment sensitivity [as measured with the Behavioral Inhibition
System (BIS) scale] increased conflict adaptation in post-punishment trials,
punishing highly punishment sensitive participants did not modulate conflict
adaptation but lead to a general slow-down in RTs in post-punishment trials.
The authors interpret their data in the framework of the Yerkes and Dodson
(1908) law and suggest that for highly punishment sensitive individuals,
punishment-associated arousal was too high to benefit conflict adaptation.
However, we do not think that this framework is suited to thoroughly explain
our results, given that disfluency can hardly be compared to the aversive
experience of punishment.
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In sum, the two accounts presented above, i.e., the adaptation-
by-motivation account, and the resource competition account,
are equally well suited to explain our results. In fact, they are not
mutually exclusive but closely intervened. After all, the negative
valence of disfluency (just as the negative valence of conflict
stimuli, see Botvinick, 2007) might at least in part be due to
the increased processing demands of disfluent (and incongru-
ent) trials. The only caveat might be that our results are hard
to reconcile with the interpretation of van Steenbergen et al.
(2009) outlined in the Introduction. To reiterate, the authors
found no conflict adaptation following positive signals and argued
that the positive signals presumably counteracted the aversive
character of the conflict stimulus. Alternatively, and in line with
the adaptation-by-motivation account, the positive signals in the
van Steenbergen study that were presented as non-contingent
performance feedback might have signaled that successful per-
formance is not a value by itself and thereby counteracted the
intrinsic reward signal (see also Dreisbach and Fischer, 2012a,
for a more thorough discussion). In sum, random reward (van
Steenbergen et al., 2009, 2012; see also Stürmer et al., 2011), no-
reward in a reward context (Braem et al., 2012) and repeated
experience of disfluency (the results presented here) have all been
found to reduce or eliminate conflict adaptation. The common
underlying mechanism might be that in all these situations, the
intrinsic reward signal after successful conflict resolution was
reduced.
It is important to note that the present findings and the
suggested interpretations do not at all contradict the repeatedly
shown aversive nature of conflict stimuli and their role for con-
flict adaptation (Dreisbach and Fischer, 2012b; Schouppe et al.,
2012, 2015; Fritz and Dreisbach, 2013, 2014). What we have
shown here is that increasing the negative valence of conflict
stimuli via disfluency (and thus independently from conflict
strength) does not increase conflict adaptation effects. But at
the same time, it is well documented that (1) disfluency trig-
gers processing adjustments in terms of a reduced fluency effect
(Dreisbach and Fischer, 2011) and that (2) conflict adaptation
effects increase with increasing conflict strength (Takezawa and
Miyatani, 2005; Forster et al., 2011; Wendt et al., 2014). Therefore,
we argue that the aversive signal conveyed by the amount of
conflict triggers conflict adaptation. Yet it seems that aversive
stimulus information from different sources (here: from percep-
tual fluency vs. response conflict) does not add up to increase
sequential conflict adaptation. That is, the aversiveness must be
tied to conflict processing and not to stimulus processing in
general.
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